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Every access to an electronic patient record leaves a trace, and in most cases nobody ever reads it. The families of those killed in Nottingham in 2023 learned what follows when somebody finally does. At Nottingham University Hospitals Trust, 11 staff were dismissed and a further 14 faced action after opening the records of two students and a grandfather who died in the attacks.
Those cases sit inside a much larger pattern. Figures obtained under freedom of information law by a news agency show that 79 hospital and ambulance trusts in England recorded 3,029 incidents of inappropriate access between 2021/22 and 2025/26. The number counts incidents rather than people, and it is almost certainly a floor. Many trusts supplied no precise figure, only confirmed breaches are included, and one trust that did answer has since apologised for understating its own total.
The reasons vary in gravity. Curiosity accounts for many cases. Others are darker: one employee was reported to have checked a spouse's file in what was described as a potential domestic violence situation, and details from records have turned up in messaging groups. Staff reportedly opened the files of victims of the 2024 Southport attack as well, and a Cambridgeshire hospital is investigating up to 40 colleagues over the record of a three-year-old boy injured in a crocodile enclosure. In Bristol, at least five staff opened the record of Oliver McGowan, who died in 2016, and the trust has apologised. A decade-old death offered no protection.
NHS England's chief executive, Sir Jim Mackey, told trusts in September to suspend any employee suspected of unauthorised access immediately and to cut their system access while the facts are established. More than 200 staff have been dismissed since 2020. The Information Commissioner's Office expects trusts to report breaches that threaten patients' rights within 72 hours and has been plain that curiosity is no legitimate reason to open a file. Each of these measures is right, and each acts after the event.
The difficulty lies in how discovery happens. In the cases above, breaches surfaced because a family asked, a complaint arrived or a request for information was answered. A record system that lets a large workforce open almost any file, and relies on staff declining to do so, will keep producing the same result. Credible protection would tie access to a demonstrable care relationship and raise automatic alerts when a record belongs to a patient in the news or is otherwise vulnerable. Routine analysis of audit logs would catch behaviour that no complaint ever surfaces. None of this is free, and trust boards working to financial targets will be tempted to treat monitoring as discretionary. That is a leadership decision and it should be taken visibly, with a named executive accountable for the result. Suppliers of records systems and health-tech firms should expect these capabilities to become standard procurement requirements, and those that offer them early will have an advantage.
The timing matters because government policy points towards a single patient record, wider use of the NHS App and greater sharing of data across care settings and with researchers. Each step asks the public to accept that more people can reach more of their information. The life sciences strategy rests on the same consent, since industry access to NHS data depends on a public that believes the data is safe. A patient who learns that dozens of strangers read a victim's file because they could will reasonably ask what a single record changes. Ministers cannot answer by pointing to disciplinary statistics.
Patient advocacy groups say that people disclose their most sensitive information on the assumption of strict confidentiality, and that cases like these erode trust well beyond the trust involved. They also criticise the lack of transparency that follows a breach, which compounds the distress of victims and families. Trusts should tell those affected promptly who accessed a record and what has been done. Boards should publish annual counts of confirmed breaches, so that national figures no longer depend on freedom of information requests that only 79 trusts answered precisely.
The single patient record will be judged on how the NHS behaves when its safeguards fail. A health service that finds its own breaches and tells patients promptly can ask the public for more of their data. One that learns of them from outside will be asked to justify the request, and the answer will have to be better than a suspension letter.