Parliament’s growing frustration with dependence on American tech giants exposes a deeper problem in UK digital sovereignty.
Calls for the NHS to prioritise British technology companies are no longer a fringe argument. They have now entered the mainstream of Westminster scrutiny. At a recent session of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, MPs confronted ministers with a simple question. Why does the NHS continue to rely on US corporations for critical digital infrastructure when the UK is seeking to strengthen its own technology sector.
The discussion was animated by a broader anxiety. The NHS has become one of the largest public sector customers for Microsoft and other American platforms, with spending rising sharply through multi year agreements negotiated at national level. Several MPs argued that this is no longer sustainable. Samantha Niblett, MP for South Derbyshire, went further, accusing Microsoft of exploiting its market dominance and locking public bodies into long term contracts that appear good value initially and then escalate significantly over time.
Her concerns were not abstract. She cited the memorandum of understanding with Microsoft that signalled £9bn of future spend and noted that nearly £2bn had already been spent on software licensing in just five months of the strategic partnership. The recent end of security support for Windows 10 has added another layer of cost. Government departments are now paying for additional safeguards to compensate for an ageing platform that remains embedded across the public sector.
For Emily Darlington, MP for Milton Keynes Central, the issue extends far beyond procurement. She argued that reliance on non UK companies raises national security, cyber resilience and economic competitiveness questions. Palantir’s £330m contract to operate the NHS federated data platform became a focal point. Why, she asked, is one of the most sensitive data infrastructures in the country being run by an overseas provider when the UK is the second most targeted nation globally for cyber attacks. Her argument was straightforward. Building capacity at home is both an economic opportunity and a strategic necessity.
Ministers and officials attempted to reassure the committee. Ian Murray, responsible for digital government and data, described efforts to improve coordination across departments. The implication was that procurement is becoming more strategic and that government is aware of the risks of over dependence on any single supplier. Yet the underlying tension remained unresolved. The UK does not currently have a unified industrial strategy that positions domestic tech companies as first class partners for large scale NHS transformation. Without such a strategy, the default will always tilt toward companies with the scale, infrastructure and commercial leverage to shape complex national programmes.
The debate points to something more fundamental. Technology procurement is no longer a transactional exercise. It is a question of digital sovereignty, public value and long term national capability. As the NHS expands its use of advanced analytics, cloud services and data platforms, the decisions made today will determine who controls the underlying architecture of the health system for years to come.
MPs are right to demand scrutiny. The NHS cannot modernise at the pace required if it becomes increasingly locked into external ecosystems that constrain choice and inflate costs. Nor can the UK build a competitive tech sector if its own public institutions do not back domestic innovation.
A future digital NHS must be built on capability, resilience and independence. That will not happen by accident. It will require a deliberate shift in policy, investment and procurement culture. The debate in Parliament may be the first sign that the country is finally ready to confront this.
